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Abstract
The obesity epidemic and excessive consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages have led to 
proposals of economics-based interventions to promote healthy eating in the United States. 
Targeted food and beverage taxes and subsidies are prominent examples of such potential 
intervention strategies. This paper examines the differential effects of taxing sugar-sweetened 
beverages by calories and by ounces on beverage demand. To properly measure the extent of 
substitution and complementarity between beverage products, we developed a fully modified 
distance metric model of differentiated product demand that endogenizes the cross-price effects. 
We illustrated the proposed methodology in a linear approximate almost ideal demand system, 
although other flexible demand systems can also be used. In the empirical application using 
supermarket scanner data, the product-level demand model consists of 178 beverage products with 
combined market share of over 90%. The novel demand model outperformed the conventional 
distance metric model in non-nested model comparison tests and in terms of the economic 
significance of model predictions. In the fully modified model, a calorie-based beverage tax was 
estimated to cost $1.40 less in compensating variation than an ounce-based tax per 3,500 beverage 
calories reduced. This difference in welfare cost estimates between two tax strategies is more than 
three times as much as the difference estimated by the conventional distance metric model. If 
applied to products purchased from all sources, a 0.04-cent per kcal tax on sugar-sweetened 
beverages is predicted to reduce annual per capita beverage intake by 5,800 kcal.
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With obesity rates remaining at epidemic levels in the United States (Ogden et al. 2012) and 
obesity-related noncommunicable diseases inflicting large economic burdens on society, 
public policy makers have given increased consideration to policies with potential to 
promote healthy eating. To address the imbalance between dietary energy intake and 
expenditure that underlies excess body weight, policy proposals have targeted calorie-dense 
foods with minimal nutritional value. Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), which include 
carbonated soft drinks (CSDs), fruit drinks, and sports and energy drinks, accounted for an 
8The conditions are: first-stage beverage demand is homogenous of degree zero in pbht, and yht; demand is non-negative; group 
expenditure on beverages is less than income; and the Slutsky substitution matrix is symmetric and negative semidefinite (see 
Theorem 2 in LaFrance and Hanemann 1989).
10The complete SAS and STATA codes for estimation and simulation are posted online as supplementary data.
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estimated 7% of total energy intake for an average American in 2005– 2006 (National 
Cancer Institute 2010) and are a significant risk factor for obesity and obesity-related health 
complications (e.g., Schulze et al. 2004). Public health advocates and some policy makers 
have targeted SSBs for potential policy interventions.
Policy interventions aimed at reducing SSB intake in the United States have focused on two 
factors affecting demand: accessibility and affordability. Examples of access restrictions 
include state or local bans on regular or all carbonated soft drinks in schools (Huang and 
Kiesel 2012), policies that limit the availability of SSBs at meetings and events (New York 
City Department of Health, 2013), and New York City's 2012 policy proposal restricting the 
sale of SSBs to containers no more than 16 ounces in size in food service establishments.
Taxes on SSBs represent the most common policy aimed at making SSBs less affordable. In 
2012, eight U.S. states and two cities filed SSB tax legislation (Rudd Center for Food Policy 
& Obesity 2013). However, no state or city has enacted an excise tax that approaches the 
magnitudes required to significantly alter consumer demand for SSBs. One reason a 
significant excise tax on SSBs has not passed is the concerns about the health and economic 
implications of these taxes. Taxing SSBs may have the unintended consequence of causing 
consumers to substitute other calorie-dense but untaxed beverages and foods (e.g., Fletcher, 
Frisvold, and Tefft 2010). With regard to economic impact, assuming consumers are fully 
rational, an SSB tax could reduce consumer surplus in the short run before any potential 
long-term health benefits and savings in medical costs are realized.
An optimal taxation strategy would seek to achieve a given level of reduction in SSB 
calories at the lowest cost to consumers. The majority of existing SSB excise tax proposals 
in the United States specify a per-volume tax (i.e., cent per ounce). This strategy overlooks 
that a large variety of SSB products on the market are differentiated by caloric content, 
among other product attributes. For example, the mean energy content for the 91 top-selling 
SSB products in New York State markets between 2007 and 2011 was 91.6 kcal/8-ounce1 
serving, with a standard deviation of 33.7.2 Ceteris paribus, a tax levied based on the caloric 
density of SSB products may be more efficient in reducing SSB calories than an ounce-
based tax.
The objective of this study was to simulate the gain in efficiency from a calorie-based tax 
scheme compared with an ounce-based one using demand parameters estimated from a 
product-level demand model. Our demand model encompasses 178 beverage products 
accounting for 95% of all nonalcoholic beverages (excluding milk, liquid coffee and tea, and 
soft drink powder) in volume across four New York markets. We measured the efficiency of 
an SSB tax by compensating variation (CV) per 3,500 kcal3 beverage energy reduced. The 
extant literature on U.S. SSB demand (Zhen et al. 2011, 2014; Dharmasena and Capps 2012; 
Lin et al. 2011; Finkelstein et al. 2013) simulates the effects of ounce-based SSB taxes using 
parameters estimated from category-level demand models, where product-level substitutions 
11 kcal = 4.184 kJ; 1 fl oz = 29.574 ml.
2Authors’ calculation based on Nielsen ScanTrack sales data and calorie information collected from manufacturers’ websites.
33,500 kcal per pound of body weight is a widely used rule for back-of-the-envelope calculations of weight gain/loss resulting from 
changes in energy intake.
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are not explicitly modeled. Because a calorie-based SSB tax changes the relative prices of 
SSB products, estimating product-level substitutions is essential. By allowing for product-
level substitutions, this study fills an important gap in the literature on targeted food and 
beverage taxes.
We also contribute to the methodology literature on differentiated product demand by 
introducing a novel approach to incorporating product heterogeneity into the estimated 
cross-price effects. Our demand model builds on the distance metric (DM) approach of 
Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002), which specifies cross-price effects between differentiated 
products as functions of their closeness in the attribute space. We modify the conventional 
DM model by endogenizing the cross-price effect between two rival products using their 
budget shares. In the application to New York beverage demand, the new model, which we 
call the fully modified DM (FMDM) model, outperforms the conventional model in both 
statistical and economic significance. Compared with the FMDM model, a conventional DM 
model underestimates the degree of product substitution and, therefore, overestimates the net 
effect of a beverage tax on beverage calories purchased. Simulations based on demand 
estimates from the FMDM model suggest that a calorie-based SSB tax would cost $1.40 less 
in consumer surplus loss per 3,500 kcal of beverage energy reduced than an ounce-based 
tax. The conventional DM model underestimates the savings in consumer surplus, attainable 
by switching from an ounce-based tax to a calorie-based one, by more than a factor of three.
DIMENSION REDUCTION METHODS
For most food and beverage categories on the U.S. market, products within the same 
category are differentiated by various product attributes. In an unrestricted product-level 
demand system, there are n2 price coefficients, where n is the number of products. Imposing 
symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-up restrictions reduces the number of parameters to n(n 
–1) 2. Despite this reduction, the dimension of the parameter space is still too large to 
estimate for any system with more than a few dozen products.
Three approaches have been used to reduce the dimension of the parameter space. First, 
assuming the consumer chooses at most one unit of a product in each shopping trip, a family 
of discrete-choice models is available for modeling product substitutions within a category 
(e.g., Nevo 2001). However, this approach does not identify consumer choices across 
categories. The second approach uses multistage budgeting to limit the number of products 
or product categories the consumer has to choose from at each stage of the budget decision 
(e.g., Ellison et al. 1997). Although this approach no longer restricts the consumer to one 
unit of a product as in a discrete-choice model, it restricts substitution or complementarity 
patterns between products from different categories. Because there is often more than one 
way to categorize products, the estimated product-level cross-price effects depend on the 
chosen categorization. When there are a large number of products, one may need several 
budgeting stages to keep the number of goods tractable at each stage. The third approach 
uses DM models to solve the dimensionality problem by casting the n2 -dimensional price 
effects into the lower-dimensional product attribute space. In contrast to discrete-choice 
models, a DM model allows consumers to purchase any number of products within the 
budget constraint. Unlike the multistage budgeting approach, the cross-price effects in DM 
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models are not determined by one and only one categorization scheme but by multiple 
product attributes. Most DM models are linear in parameters—a desirable property in light 
of recent findings of numerical difficulties in estimating some nonlinear discrete-choice 
models (Dubé, Fox, and Su 2012; Knittel and Metaxoglou 2014). Nevertheless, a weakness 
of DM models is that the cross-price effects are limited to the attributes specified by the 
researcher. Therefore, it is important to use a comprehensive list of product attributes to 
reduce this bias.
THE FMDM ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM
The linear approximate version of Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) almost ideal demand 
system (AIDS) is the most popular functional form adopted in DM models. Assuming weak 
separability between beverage products and the numéraire good, we can use two-stage 
budgeting to characterize consumer preferences for beverage products. In the first stage, the 
consumer allocates expenditures between the numéraire good and the beverage group. In the 
second stage, the consumer chooses beverage products conditional on total beverage 
expenditure. We used the following linear approximate AIDS to represent the conditional 
demand in the second stage4:
(1)
where winht is the budget share of product i in market h and period t; αiht is an intercept; pjht 
is the price of product j normalized to one at j 's sample mean (Moschini 1995); xht is per 
capita total beverage expenditure; In  is the group price index for 
beverage products and subscript b stands for beverage group; Nht represents the set of nht 
beverage products available in market h and period t ; and γ and β are parameters.
The DM approach specifies the cross-price effect between two products as functions of their 
closeness in attribute space. The key difference between the FMDM model and a 
conventional DM model lies in the specification of the cross-price effect. The FMDM cross-
price coefficient γijht is written as
(2)
where dm is the parameter associated with the m th discrete product attribute (e.g., flavor),M 
is the number of discrete attributes, w*mijht = wjntκmjj / ωmiht, κmjj is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if products i and J (j ≠ i) share the same level/description in the m th attribute (e.g., both 
cola products), and 0 otherwise (including the case κmii = 0), and 
.
5
 We included wiht in ωmiht to meet the symmetry condition 
γijht = γjiht. Instead of nht –1 cross prices in a standard linear approximate AIDS, there M 
4Other flexible functional forms may also be used. One such candidate is the linear approximate Exact Affine Stone Index demand 
system of Lewbel and Pendakur (2009).
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cross-price terms, , in the budget share equation of an FMDM 
model. Because budget shares appear on both sides of equation (1), we accounted for this 
simultaneity in the formulation of elasticities and in econometric estimation.
For most consumer product markets, observed differences in product attributes and market 
conditions cannot explain all demand fluctuations. For example, the cross-price relationship 
between Coke and Pepsi may be different from their cross-price relationships with a private-
label cola product because of differences in brand equity and other less quantifiable 
attributes (e.g., taste), even though all three are cola products. The FMDM model uses 
budget shares wiht and wjht, which are outcomes of both observed and unobserved drivers of 
demand, to quantify this heterogeneity in cross-price effects. The conventional DM model 
does not have this feature and specifies the cross-price coefficient as , 
where .6
FMDM Elasticities
In this section, we provide the conditional and unconditional price elasticities and 
expenditure elasticities for the FMDM model. Derivation details are available in the online 
appendix. For brevity of notation, we dropped the market and time subscripts h and t from 
the FMDM elasticities. In matrix notation, the Marshallian price elasticities conditional on 
total beverage expenditure are
(3)
The matrix elements in equation (3) are Hij = ηij in H (n × n matrix), where ηij is the 
conditional Marshallian elasticity for product i with respect to price of j; Aij = –δij + γij/ wi – 
βiwj in A (n × n matrix), where δij = 1 for i = j, and 0 otherwise; 
 in Bm(n × n diagonal matrix); Dmij = dm w* mij in pj in Dm 
(n × n matrix)  in (n × n diagonal matrix); Fmij = w * mij in Fm (n × n 
matrix); Ui = βi/wi in U (n × 1 vector); Vj = wj In Pj in V (1 × n vector); and I is a n × n 
identity matrix. The FMDM expenditure elasticities are
(4)
5We also developed a simpler specification of the cross-price coefficient: , which was not 
normalized by ωmiht. However, simulation based on this alternative model suggested that an ounce-based SSB tax would increase 
total beverage calories in some markets and periods. Although an unintended consequence of this magnitude is not impossible, it is 
less plausible given that all existing studies of SSB demand predict a net decrease in beverage calories following a volume-based SSB 
tax. Therefore, we rejected this alternative specification in favor of equation (2).
6The empirical findings were qualitatively the same when the cross-price effect in the conventional DM model was not normalized by 
(1+Σκmik), i.e. , i.e. .
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where, in addition to matrices defined in equation (3), the matrix elements are Ei = εi in E (n 
× 1 vector) with εi being the expenditure elasticity for product i, and t is an n × 1 vector of 
ones. Without the ones. Without the Bm, Cm, Dm, and Fm terms, equations (3) and (4) 
become the price and expenditure elasticities, respectively, for a conventional DM model 
with a Stone group price index (Green and Alston, 1990). These additional terms account for 
the effects of endogenous budget shares in γijht on cross-price elasticities.
To derive unconditional price elasticities, note that a change in price of j affects demand for 
i in two ways: first through the price effect conditional on total beverage expenditure and 
second through an expenditure effect. This can be expressed as
(5)
where the superscript u denotes unconditional price elasticity. The last term in equation (5) 
can be decomposed as follows:
(6)
where qb is total beverage quantity, and ebb is overall price elasticity for the beverage group 
in the first stage of the two-stage budgeting. The wj term in curly brackets in equation (6) 
measures the first-order effect of a change in pj on group price pb, while the remaining terms 
in curly brackets sum up the second-order effect of changing pj on pb through budget share 
changes. In matrix notation, equation (6) can be expressed as
(7)
where Exp is 1 × n with the j th element equal to ∂ln x ∂ln pj and Wj = wj in W (1 × n vector). 
Solving (7) for E xp gives
(8)
Finally, the unconditional price elasticities in matrix form are
(9)
where the n × n matrix Hu has  as its elements.
The Quasi-FMDM Model
The FMDM elasticity formulas are more complicated than those of a conventional DM 
model. To evaluate the merit of this added sophistication, we developed a quasi-FMDM 
model that is an approximation to the FMDM but uses the simpler elasticities of a 
conventional DM model. The cross-price effect in the quasi-FMDM model is specified as
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, where
, and wj0 is base share defined as the sample mean budget share of product j. Because the 
base shares are constants, elasticities for the quasi-FMDM model simplify to those of a 
conventional DM model.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Nielsen ScanTrack scanner data provide nonalcoholic beverage sales data for the Albany, 
Buffalo, New York City, and Syracuse Nielsen markets. Each market consists of a cluster of 
counties and is not confined by city or state boundaries.7 For example, the Albany market 
includes not only counties in New York but also counties in Massachusetts and Vermont, the 
Buffalo market incorporates counties in Pennsylvania, and the New York City market covers 
parts of Connecticut and New Jersey. The scanner data are collected from a sample of 
supermarkets with annual sales of at least $2 million and projected to the market level by 
Nielsen for this store format. Data on milk, liquid tea and coffee, and soft drink powder and 
sales at convenience stores, drug stores, club stores, and mass merchandisers were not 
available to the authors and are not included in the model. Sales data were recorded at the 
Universal Product Code (UPC) level and cover 64 four-week periods beginning on January 
28, 2007, and ending on December 24, 2011. Scanner data included UPC-specific 
information such as package and container sizes, product module, brand, and others. The 
authors collected information on the caloric content of products from manufacturers’ 
websites and linked that information with the sales data. To limit the number of products in 
the demand model and preserve as much product differentiation as possible, we created 
unique products by aggregating similar UPC items based on brand and product module. For 
example, Coke, Diet Coke, Caffeine-Free Coke, and Caffeine-Free Diet Coke are four 
unique products in our demand model, but 2-liter Coke and Coke in 12-ounce cans are 
considered the same product.
Descriptive Statistics
The beverage market is characterized by a large number of products with small individual 
market shares. In 2007–2011, 18 products had market shares of 1% or above and 
collectively represented 43% of the beverage market in dollar sales. Lowering the market 
share threshold to 0.5% increases the number of products to 45 and combined market share 
7The scanner data exclude sales taxes. The level of sales taxes levied on soft drinks ranged from 0% in Massachusetts and Vermont to 
7% in New Jersey and did not change during the sample period (Bridging the Gap, 2014). Therefore, differences in state sales tax rates 
are absorbed into the product-market specific fixed effects in the demand model (see equation [12]).
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to 61%. To capture as much of the market in the demand model as feasible, we included all 
products whose total dollar sales over the 2007–2011 period represented 0.1% or more of 
the beverage markets. The resulting data set for estimation yielded an unbalanced panel of 
43,087 observations across 178 products, accounting for 92% of total dollar sales in the four 
markets.
Table 1 presents per capita annual volume, energy, and expenditures for the 178 products by 
product category. In these markets, CSDs account for the majority of beverage energy 
(51.5%) and a smaller share of total beverage expenditures (24.1%). Because the ScanTrack 
data we have does not account for sales at retail outlets other than supermarkets, it is useful 
to examine supermarket shares within total retail sales. Zhen et al. (2014) report estimates of 
national average household beverage purchases by category based on the 2006 Nielsen 
Homescan—household-based scanner data on food purchases from all retail outlets. 
Assuming comparable sales patterns between 2006 and 2007–2011 and between New York 
and the rest of the country, a comparison of table 1 with purchase quantities in Zhen et al. 
(2014) indicates that, in terms of volume shares, ScanTrack supermarkets accounted for 
about 64% of regular and diet CSD sales, 46% of sports and energy drink sales, 73% of 
100% juice sales, 39% of fruit drink sales, and 76% of bottled water sales. The lower shares 
of sports and energy drinks and fruit drinks may be attributed, in part, to sales data on soft 
drink powder being unavailable to this study, while Zhen et al.'s data set included powdered 
drinks.
Attribute Variables
We specified seven discrete attributes with potential relevance to determining cross-price 
effects. The variable brand family takes 92 distinct values associated with 92 brand families. 
For example, Coke is a brand family that encompasses regular and Diet Coke and Caffeine-
Free Coke. It is reasonable to expect products under the same brand family to be closer 
substitutes than products under different brand families. The variable name brand identifies 
any beverage product that is not a private-label product. The variable major product 
identifies products that had a market share of 0.5% or higher over the 2007–2011 period. 
Because these products are likely to receive larger shelf space and be available in more 
stores, they may be closer substitutes to one another than to products having much smaller 
market shares. The variable product category classifies the 178 products into six product 
categories (see table 1) consistent with the categorization scheme used in previous category-
level beverage demand models (e.g., Zhen et al. 2011; Dharmasena and Capps 2012). The 
variable energy category distinguishes regular CSDs, full-calorie sports and energy drinks, 
and full-calorie fruit drinks from low-calorie (defined as ≤ 10 kcal/8-ounce serving) versions 
of these sweetened beverages and bottled water. The rationale is that consumers might 
perceive soft drinks with more similar energy content to be more substitutable. The variable 
caffeine indicates the presence of caffeine, which is found in some CSDs and all energy 
drinks. The variable flavor takes nine distinct values: cola, root beer, citrus for CSDs/fruit 
drinks/sports drinks, citrus for 100% juice, ginger ale, pepper, seltzer, apple, and cranberry.
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EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
We used the first-stage demand to obtain an estimate of the overall beverage price elasticity 
(ebb) and to calculate the welfare effects of SSB taxes. LaFrance and Hanemann (1989) 
showed that under fairly mild conditions an incomplete demand system provides the exact 
and correct measures of welfare changes.
(10)
where wbht is the budget share of nonalcoholic beverages in market h and periodt; αbht is an 
intercept; Poht is the price index for the numéraire good and subscript o stands for other 
goods and services;9 yht is per capita income; pht is a cost-of-living index defined as ln pht = 
α0 + αbht ln pbht + αoht ln poht + 0.5r (ln pbht)2 + rbo ln pbht ln poht + 0.5roo (ln poht)2; and r 
and b are parameters. To account for market and time fixed effects, the intercept term αbht is 
augmented as follows:
(11)
where mkjht, qwkht, and yrlht are binary indicator variables for market j, the k th fourweek 
period (out of a total of 13) of a year, and year l, respectively; and αb0 cbj, gbk, and vbl are 
coefficients.
The Stone price indices pbht and poht may be endogenous because they use current budget 
shares as weights. We used the loglinear analogue of Laspeyres prices (Moschini 1995) for 
the beverage group and the numéraire good as instruments. For example, the instrument for 
ln pbht was calculated as . The budget share equation (10) and 
the two instrumental variable equations for ln pbht and ln poht were estimated jointly using 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML). The parameter estimates and their standard 
errors are reported in table 2.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Durbin 1954; Wu 1973; Hausman 1978) test for the exogeneity 
of pbht and poht produced a test statistic of 30.14 (p = 0.115, df = 22). The mean overall 
beverage price elasticity is −0.967 and −0.658 with and without correction for simultaneity 
bias, respectively. Although exogeneity was not rejected at conventional significance levels, 
the magnitude of difference in elasticity point estimates seems to be economically important. 
Therefore, the subsequent analyses are based on estimates of the first-stage demand that 
corrected for the simultaneity bias.
DM Model Estimation
To account for demand heterogeneity across products, markets, seasons, and over time, we 
augmented the intercept of equation (1) as follows:
9Price index for the numéraire good was obtained by solving lnCPIht = wbht ln pbht + woht ln poht for poht, where CPI is the 
consumer price index for all goods and services.
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(12)
where ϕih is the constant for product i in market h; zci is an indicator variable for product c, 
equal to 1 if c = i and 0 is the temperature for market h and period t; trendht is a linear time 
trend; and, andϕ, φ, and Θ are parameters. By including product-specific market, seasonal, 
and trend effects, equation (12) controls for a wide range of heterogeneities that, if 
unaccounted for, may result in biased estimates of price coefficients.
The budget share equation (1) cannot be estimated as a system of nht equations because nht 
—the number of products in market h and period t—is too large and varies across markets 
and over time. Consistent with previous DM studies, we estimated equation (1) as a single 
equation. Some studies restricted the own-price coefficients γii and expenditure coefficients 
βi to be functions of product attributes (e.g., Pinkse and Slade 2004; Rojas and Peterson 
2008; Bonanno 2013). We did not impose these restrictions to build in sufficient flexibility 
for the estimated own-price and expenditure effects. In the estimation equation, we 
interacted log own price ln piht and log real group expenditure ln (xht/pbht) with product 
dummies zci to obtain product-specific estimates for γii and βi.
Symmetry is satisfied in DM models. Homogeneity may be imposed in estimation by 
normalizing product prices by a numéraire beverage, although we did not follow this 
approach. Adding-up is more difficult, if not impossible, to impose during estimation 
because the number of products changes across h and t. To ensure that the elasticity 
estimates are consistent with economic theory, we imposed the Engel , 
Cournot , and Euler  aggregations on the 
DM models after estimation.11 This is in line with the approach in the literature on censored 
demand system estimation that also has difficulty imposing adding-up in estimation (e.g., 
Yen, Lin, and Smallwood 2003; Sam and Zheng 2010).
We estimated the conventional DM, quasi-DM, and FMDM models using fixed-effects (FE) 
two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the product-market-specific intercept ϕih is the fixed 
effect. Because group expenditure can be endogenous (LaFrance 1991), we used ln (x̃ht/p̃bht) 
to instrument ln(xht/pbht),where x̃ht is the mean group expenditure for the same period in 
other years. In addition, we used the cross-price terms of the conventional DM and quasi-
FMDM to instrument the endogenous cross-price terms of the FMDM model. Table 3 
summarizes the endogenous regressors and excluded instruments for each DM model.
DM Model Estimation Results
Table 4 presents the DM estimation results. For brevity, the coefficient estimates for own 
prices and demand shifters in equation (12) are not displayed. The generalized R2 of Pesaran 
11We used these restrictions to recover the own- and cross-price elasticities of the n th product in each market and period. 
Nevertheless, all empirical results remained qualitatively unchanged when these restrictions were not imposed.
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and Smith (1994) is used as a goodness-of-fit measure because the standard R2 is not a valid 
model selection criterion for instrumental variable regressions. A comparison of the 
generalized R2 suggests that the FMDM and quasi-FMDM models fit the data equally well 
and outperform the conventional DM model. The equivalence of FMDM and quasi-FMDM 
models in model fit is not surprising because the generalized R2 is based on prediction errors 
and the two models have identical instruments. Because the three DM models are not nested, 
we used the Rivers-Vuong (Rivers and Vuong 2002) non-nested model comparison test to 
examine whether the difference in model fit is statistically significant. Table 5 reports the 
test results. According to the test, the improvement in the generalized R2 of the FMDM and 
quasi-FMDM models over the conventional DM model is statistically significant at the 1% 
level, while the FMDM is statistically indistinguishable from its approximate version in 
terms of goodness of fit.
Revisiting table 4, the coefficients for seven conventional DM model attributes and six 
FMDM and quasi-FMDM model attributes are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Consistent with the a priori expectation that the degree of product substitution increases with 
closeness in the attribute space, the coefficients for major product, product category, energy 
category, and flavor are positive across the three models. For the conventional DM and 
quasi-FMDM models, the negative and significant coefficients on brand family and name 
brand suggest that two products being in the same brand family or being name brands 
decreases substitutability. Of note, the coefficients on the attribute variables in the FMDM 
model are not directly comparable with those of the conventional DM and quasi-FMDM 
models in sign and magnitude due to substantive differences in model specification and 
formulation of elasticities. Because budget shares appear on both sides of the demand 
equation, a negative coefficient in the FMDM model does not necessarily suggest that 
closeness in the associated attribute reduces the degree of substitution.
In terms of elasticity estimates, the median unconditional own-price elasticity is 
approximately −1.9 in all three models. Of the 7,211,034 cross-price elasticities in the 
sample, about one-half of them are negative, indicating that not all products are substitutes. 
This differs from applications of discrete-choice models that restrict products to be 
substitutes. The FMDM model has slightly higher median cross-price elasticity than the 
conventional DM and quasi-FMDM models.
The above comparisons, however, do not give a full account of the differences across DM 
models. In a market with a large number of products and an assortment of product attributes, 
small differences in price elasticities may add up to large differences in predicted SSB tax-
induced changes in total calories, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. In the next section, we 
examine this possibility through counterfactual simulations.
Tax Simulations
Table 6 reports results from a simulation of two hypothetical excise tax scenarios. In the first 
scenario, a half-cent per-ounce tax is levied on all SSBs with more than 10 kcal/8-ounce 
serving. In the second scenario, a 0.04-cent per kcal tax—equivalent to a half-cent tax per 
ounce of regular Coke12—is imposed on SSB products. In both cases, we assumed the 
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excise tax is passed one-for-one to retail prices. Using the estimated unconditional 
elasticities, we predicted the outcomes for all markets and time periods.
In the first panel of table 6, the first-order effect measures the direct effect of an SSB tax on 
group price index pbht holding budget shares fixed at the pretax levels. The second-order 
effect reflects the indirect effect of changing budget shares on the group price index pbht (see 
equation [6] and related discussion). On average, the first-order effect of a half-cent per 
ounce SSB tax is to raise pbht by 7.56% compared with 7.25% from a 0.04-cent per kcal 
SSB tax. The second-order effect is mostly statistically insignificant and trivial in 
magnitude. This is consistent with results in Green and Alston (1990) and Alston, Foster, 
and Green (1994) showing that this second-order effect is quantitatively unimportant in 
calculating elasticities.
The second panel of table 6 presents simulated reductions in beverage calories following an 
SSB tax. Two noteworthy patterns emerge from these results. First, within each DM model, 
the ounce-based tax always produces less calorie reduction than the calorie-based tax even 
though the calorie-based tax is less expensive in terms of its impact on group price. Second, 
the magnitude of reduction continues to decline as we move from the conventional DM 
model to the quasi-FMDM model and then to the FMDM model. These occur because the 
FMDM model estimates a higher degree of product substitution than the conventional DM 
and quasi-FMDM models. As substitutability increases, consumers are more likely to offset 
the impact of an SSB tax by switching to untaxed caloric beverages (e.g., 100% juice) and 
SSBs that have lower relative prices than other SSBs. A calorie-based SSB tax is better able 
to reduce this slippage effect than an ounce-based one.
We calculated the CV associated with each SSB tax strategy as follows:
(13)
where the market and time subscripts are suppressed to simplify notation, the superscript * 
denotes posttax price level.13 Mean per capita CV estimates and predicted tax burdens are 
reported in the third panels of table 6. Consistent with the above discussion, the tax burden 
is the highest in the FMDM model due to a smaller predicted reduction in SSB demand; and 
a calorie-based SSB tax implies a lower CV and tax burden than an ounce-based one within 
each DM model. Finally, the FMDM model predicts that a calorie-based SSB tax would cost 
$1.40 less in consumer surplus loss per 3,500 kcal reduced than an ounce-based one. In 
contrast, the difference in CV predicted by the conventional DM model between the two tax 
scenarios is $0.42 per 3,500 kcal reduced. The quasi-FMDM model, despite its equivalence 
with the FMDM in the goodness of fit measure, predicts a lower estimate, at $0.87 per 3,500 
kcal reduced, of the difference in CV between the two taxes.
12There are 100 kcal per 8 ounces of regular Coke.
13The term ub0 was recovered by solving this equation consisting of pretax prices: 
 (See equation 
{4} of Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).
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CONCLUSION
U.S. policy makers continue to propose SSB tax legislation as a means to curb obesity and 
raise government revenue. When the main objective of an SSB tax is to improve public 
health, we show that a calorie-based SSB tax is more efficient than an ounce-based SSB tax 
in the sense that the former is able to achieve a given calorie reduction target with smaller 
loss in consumer surplus. A food or beverage product is composed of a number of nutrients 
and characteristics, the levels of which may vary widely from one product to another. An 
optimal obesity-aimed food or beverage tax policy should directly target the ingredient(s) or 
nutrient(s) of concern. Because almost all calories in an SSB product come from added 
sugars, a calorie-based SSB tax is equivalent to a tax on sugars.
We proposed a new product-level demand model, called the FMDM model, to quantify the 
efficiency gain from substituting a calorie-based SSB tax for an ounce-based one. Like the 
conventional DM model, the FMDM model is able to handle hundreds of products. 
However, the new model outperforms the conventional DM model in model fit and in the 
economic significance of its predictions.
In the empirical analysis of New York supermarket beverage sales, the FMDM model 
estimated product-level demand for 178 products representing more than 90% of total 
beverage sales in Nielsen ScanTrack scanner data. For every 3,500 beverage calories 
reduced, the estimated consumer surplus loss due to a calorie-based tax is $1.40 lower than 
the loss induced by an ounce-based tax. A 0.04-cent per kcal SSB tax is predicted to reduce 
beverage energy from ScanTrack supermarkets by 9.3%, compared with 8.6% from a half-
cent per ounce tax. Applying this percentage change to beverages obtained from all sources, 
we calculated that a 0.04-cent per kcal tax on SSBs will reduce total beverage energy by 
about 5,800 kcal per capita per year.14 Compared with an ounce-based SSB tax that also 
achieves a 5,800 kcal reduction in beverage energy, the 0.04-cent per kcal SSB tax is 
estimated to save $2.35 per capita or $736 million for the U.S. population in consumer 
surplus per year. Although these numbers may seem trivial relative to the size of the U.S 
food market, to put them into perspective, the savings is equal to a nonnegligible 15.4% of 
the projected tax revenue from a per-calorie SSB tax.
We have assumed that an SSB tax is passed one for one to retail price. However, Bonnet and 
Réquillart (2013) provided evidence that the French beverage industry over-shifts cost 
changes to retail price. If this is also the case for the United States, our simulated beverage 
calorie reduction will be underestimated. We also assumed that the per-calorie and per-
ounce taxes are excise taxes included in the shelf prices. Zheng, McLaughlin, and Kaiser 
(2013) demonstrated how consumers’ ignorance about the level of sales taxes, which are not 
posted on the shelf, could cause them to purchase more than they otherwise would if fully 
informed.
The cross-price effects in DM models hinge on the attribute variables. When the researcher 
omits some attributes, the estimated cross-price effects may be biased. If the omitted-
14Total energy intake from regular CSD, sports and energy drinks, fruit drinks, and 100% juice is about 63,000 kcal per capita per 
year for people ages 5 and above based on the 2007–2008 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey.
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variable problem creates a downward bias on the cross-price elasticities in our application, 
the reported calorie reduction may be overestimated and savings from a per-calorie tax 
underestimated.
As SSBs become more expensive, consumers might substitute foods and alcoholic 
beverages. In a field experiment involving 113 households from a U.S. supermarket chain, 
Wansink et al. (2012) reported increases in beer purchase after a 10% tax was imposed on 
SSBs and other foods with little nutritional value. Because we did not have ScanTrack data 
on fluid milk, alcoholic beverage, and food sales, we were unable to estimate demand for 
these products and simulate the effects of different SSB taxes on food and alcohol 
consumption.
Finally, it is important to recognize that our study does not assess the practicality of levying 
an ounce-based tax versus a calorie-based one. An ounce-based SSB tax is likely to be easier 
to implement than a more sophisticated calorie-based tax when there is a large variety of 
SSB products in terms of caloric content. However, it is precisely when there is a large 
variation in caloric content across products that a calorie-based tax is expected to be more 
efficient in terms of consumer surplus saved. Moreover, a calorie-based tax may motivate 
beverage manufacturers to reformulate SSB products to contain less sugar, while an ounce-
based tax may be less likely to have such an effect on product formulation. Therefore, one 
cannot make a final determination on the least expensive form of tax until information on 
these aspects of the issue becomes available.
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Table 1
Average Annual per Capita Purchases, 2007-2011
Per capita
Volume (oz/year) Energy (kcal/year) Expenditure ($/year)
Regular CSD 870 10,969 20.08
Diet CSD 653 0 15.43
Sports/energy drinks 106 654 4.44
100% juice 435 6,142 21.17
Fruit drinks 339 3,538 12.16
Bottled water 840 0 10.04
Total 3,243 21,303 83.31
Notes:CSD stands for carbonated soft drink. These data represent sales of the 178 brands that are included in the DM models, which account for 
95%, 92%, and 94% of ScanTrack total nonalcoholic beverage sales in volume, dollars, and energy, respectively. The ScanTrack data we have 
exclude milk, bottled tea and coffee, and soft drink powder and do not include sales at restaurants, convenience stores, drug stores, and mass 
merchandisers. Expenditures were deflated by the consumer price index using the 2007-2011 average as the base.
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Table 2
First-Stage Incomplete AIDS Estimates
Parametersa Overall Beverage Price Elasticity
r bb b b
Est. 0.008
–0.222*** –0.967***
S.E. (0.064) (0.107) (0.169)
Note: There are 256 observations. The log likelihood is 5266. **and
***indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Reported beverage price elasticity and its standard error are average 
elasticity and standard error across all observations, respectively. Symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-up conditions were imposed to recover 
parameters for the numeraire budget share equation that was not explicitly estimated. The estimation method was FIML and controlled for 
endogeneity in the Stone prices pbht and paht. We set a0 to 0 to avoid the numerical difficulty commonly encountered in estimation of nonlinear 
AIDS (Moschini, Moro, and Green 1994). Coefficient estimates for market, season, and year fixed effects are not reported for brevity.
aCoefficient estimates and their standard errors are multiplied by 100 for readability.
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Table 4
DM Demand Model Results
Cross-Price Coefficient Est. (dm)
Product Attributes Conventional DMa Quasi-FMDM FMDM
brand family
–0.088*** (0.022) –0.222*** (0.048) –0.369*** (0.076)
name brand
–0.294*** (0.091) –0.728*** (0.115) –0.806*** (0.119)
major product 0.679*** (0.113) 0.251*** (0.101) 0.167** (0.098)
product category 0.309*** (0.039) 0.473*** (0.044) 0.560*** (0.054)
energy category 0.358*** (0.081) 0.869*** (0.068) 1.113*** (0.084)
caffeine 0.896*** (0.177) –0.126 (0.089) –0.641*** (0.102)
flavor 0.291*** (0.038) 0.774*** (0.051) 0.967*** (0.062)
Median unconditional own-price elasticity –1.917 –1.947 –1.917
Median unconditional cross-price elasticity –7.0E-04 –8.0E-05 4.2E-05
% positive own-price elasticities 4.3% 3.2% 3.5%
% negative crossprice elasticities 53.1% 50.9% 49.1%
Number of parametersb 720 720 720
Generalized R2 0.481 0.493 0.493
Note:
There are 43,087 observations.
**indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The generalized R2 is calculated 
based on Pesaran and Smith (1994).
***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The generalized R2 is calculated 
based on Pesaran and Smith (1994).
aCoefficient estimates and standard errors for the conventional DM model are multiplied by 100 for readability.
b
There are 178 product-specific own-price coefficients, 178 product-specific group expenditure coefficients, 178 product-specific temperature 
coefficients, 178 product-specific trend coefficients, 7 discrete-attribute coefficients, and an intercept. The within-transformation removes product-
market specific fixed effects prior to estimation.
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Table 5
Rivers-Vuong Test of Non-nested Models
Model A vs. Model B Test Statistic
Conventional DM vs. Quasi-FMDM 3.85***
Conventional DM vs. FMDM 3 98***
Quasi-FMDM vs. FMDM 0.15
Note:
***indicates significance at the 1% level. Under the null hypothesis of equivalence between Models A and B, the Rivers-Vuong test statistic is 
standard normally distributed. A positive (negative) statistically significant test statistic suggests that Model B (A) is preferred to Model A (B).
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Table 6
Simulated Per Capita Effects of SSB Taxes on Demand and Welfare
Conventional DM Quasi-FMDM FMDM
% change in beverage group price, ounce-based tax
First-order effecta 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Second-order effect –0.04% (0.4) 0.06% (0.6) –0.13% (1.3)
% change in beverage group price, calorie-based tax
First-order effecta 7.25% 7.25% 7.25%
Second-order effect –0.12% (0.9) 0.00% (0.0) –0.19% (2.0)
Reduction in energy intake from beverages (kcal/year)
Ounce-based tax 3,060
(53.8)
2,778
(63.8)
1,836
(57.4)
Calorie-based tax 3,090
(53.9)
2,967
(62.0)
1,976
(58.1)
Compensating variation ($/ year)
Ounce-based tax 6.07 (52.1) 6.15 (58.7) 6.00 (56.9)
Calorie-based tax 5.77 (51.3) 5.86 (58.7) 5.71 (56.6)
Tax burden ($/year)
Ounce-based tax 4.83 (34.8) 5.00 (36.2) 5.39 (35.9)
Calorie-based tax 4.65 (34.3) 4.74 (36.5) 5.13 (36.1)
Difference in CV between calorie- and ounce-based taxes per 3,500 kcal reduced ($)
0.4158 (4.2) 0.8701 (4.4) 1.4034 (2.5)
Notes:
Results are for the 178 products included in the demand models. The simulated effects and the associated t statistics (in parentheses) are averages 
over all markets and time periods. The standard errors were generated by taking 500 random draws from a multivariate normal distribution with the 
mean vector and variance-covariance matrix set to the estimated values of the first- and second-stage demand models.
a
The first-order effect is deterministic and calculated using baseline budget shares.
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